US Fails to Renegotiate Arms Control Rule for Hacking Tools The Obama administration has failed to renegotiate portions of an international arms control arrangement so that it’s simpler to export tools related to hacking and surveillance software — technologies that can be exploited by bad actors, but are also used to secure computer networks. The rare reconsideration of a rule agreed to in 2013 by 41 countries was derailed at the plenary’s annual December meeting in Vienna, leaving it up to President-elect Donald Trump’s administration whether the U.S. pushes for revisions again next year. The U.S. had pushed for more precise language to control the spread of such hacking tools without the unintended negative consequences for national cybersecurity and research that industry groups and lawmakers have complained about for months. They argue that the current language, while well meaning, broadly sweeps up research tools and technologies used to create or otherwise support hacking and surveillance software. Rep. Jim Langevin, D-R.I., said in a statement Monday that he is “deeply disappointment” by the plenary’s decision and hoped the incoming administration will continue the effort. “U.S. cybersecurity and that of our allies will be imperiled if companies and researchers are not able to quickly share defensive tools,” said Langevin, who co-chairs of the Congressional Cybersecurity Caucus. The White House referred questions Monday to the State and Commerce departments, neither of which immediately responded to requests for comment. As one of those 41 member countries of the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement, which governs the highly technical world of export controls for arms and certain technologies, the United States agreed to restrict tools related to cyber “intrusion software” that could fall into the hands of repressive regimes. The voluntary arrangement relies on unanimous agreement to abide by its rules on export controls for arms such as tanks or military aircraft and “dual-use” technologies such as advanced radar that can be used for both peaceful and military means. The failed effort was a “bummer” said Katie Moussouris, CEO and founder of Luta Security who was part of this year’s Wassenaar delegation as a U.S. industry expert. “If anybody understands how quickly you need to respond to a fire, this would essentially impede the internet’s firefighters if it was left in place,” Moussouris said. But she also noted that such work involving an international body also can take time and finding precise language is critical. The plenary did agree to tighten up language essentially specifying that the rule should apply to attacker code used to command and control malware, not regular computer defense tools that might have been caught in the rule, Moussouris said. Efforts to come up with a workable U.S. rule have highlighted the difficulty of applying the export controls restricting physical items to a virtual world that relies on the free flow of information for network security. Many companies operate in multiple countries and routinely employ foreign nationals who test their own corporate networks across borders. In May 2015, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security began working on its rule to abide by the arrangement and proposed denying the transfer of offensive tools — defined as software that uses “zero-day” exploits, or unpatched new vulnerabilities, and “rootkit” abilities that allow a person administrator-level access to a system. Because in the cyber world testing a network often requires determining first how to exploit it and attempting to do so.